2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines.

DOG PLUS SIXTEEN DAY, 7 MARCH, 1945.

There was considerable night activity characterized by sporadic mortar and sniper fire on the lines. frequent exchanges of hand and rifle grenades at close ranges occurred during the hours of darkness.

At 0520, a large calibre rocket scored a direct hit on the BLT CP. The C.O., Executive officer, Operations Officer, Adjutant and two clerks were wounded. The Communications Officer, was KIA. All the wounded were evacuated with the exception of the C.O., who instituted reorganization. The RCT Executive Officer was assigned command of BLT 2/23 shortly after daylight, and a staff was constituted by intra-regimental transfers.

The RCT order called for continuation of the attack at King Hour (0730. Boundaries, formation, and objective the same.

On request of the new CO BLT 2/23 King Hour was delayed thirty minutes to allow for the completion of the reorganization of the command group.

The attack jumped off on time (0800) with "G" , "E", and "K" Companies on line. Company "G" was on the left. "E" Company held its position because of the heavy pocket of resistance to the front. Company "F" passed to the right rear of "G" Company and passed in front of Company "E", eliminating the immediate resistance to "E" Company's front by this flank movement. The maneuver was completed leaving "G", "F", and "K" Companies online and advancing slowly, with Company "E" passing to BLT reserve in TA 201M.

Company "G" met resistance primarily from the left adjacent zone, but "F" and "K" Companies were promptly held up by intense automatic small arms and mortar fire.

It is worthy on not at this time that elements in the line which met the stiffest resistance were those confronted by draws and corridors. The terrain throughout this area was characterized by a series of broken ridges and cliff lines perpendicular to the front lines. The ground was a mixture of broken volcanic rock and sand. Accurate rifle fire was constantly received from the flanks and the high ground was completely covered by mortar fire and some small arms. The troops were forced to cover the draws to eliminate the resistance. The enemy allowed the troops to enter these draws and then pinning them down by fire from multiple supporting caves and pillboxes. Upon being "mousetrapped" into such a situation, the troops were subjected to heavy mortar concentrations. Many emplacements faced seaward to the north and northeast and were difficult to locate because of the crevices and nature of the rock. These positions constantly harassed the troops from the rear and necessitated continuous patrol and demolitions missions.

Maps of this area were inaccurate and much of the terrain was left completely uncharted.

About 1200, "I" Company (3/23) was attached to BLT 2/23 and moved to a reserve position in rear of Company "G".

The formation at 1800 this date was "G", "F", and "K" Companies. Company "G" was on the left. "I" and "E" Companies were in BLT Reserve. Contact was god on the left with BLT 1/9, and was established on the right over difficult terrain with RCT 24.

The LD was the previous day's lines and the lines at 1800 were; TA 202 F center, TA 201-O northeast, S northwest. The advance totaled one hundred yards on the right anf four hundred yards on the left.