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25th Marines - D plus 21, 12 March, 1945.

Activity during the night was concentrated on the right front of BLT-3/25 where groups of the enemy attempted to break through the line. These were repulsed by hand grenades. (The area of resistance remaining to be taken was by this time so compressed that the use of artillery, NGF, rockets and air support was denied and only by using the greatest care could mortars be used. The terrain in this area was the roughest and the most chopped up terrain encountered so far in the operation. It consisted of a series of ridges running generally perpendicularly to the sea. These ridges were in turn cut in numerous places by steep draws running parallel to the ocean. Between these main ridges were draws whose sides were nearly vertical and these draws were in turn broken at intervals by cross ridges. Control was extremely difficult due to the fact that visual contact could be maintained only between very small units and due to the fact that it was impossible to orient the map to the ground).

Div Op Or No. 21-45 was received during the night and called for a continuation of the attack by RCT-25 (BLT-2/24 and Div Recon Co attached) at K plus 60 (0800). At 0700, it was planned that a POW, captured in this area on the previous night, would attempt to induce the surrender of the remaining enemy in the area. The attack was delayed until 0900 for this purpose. Failure of the public address system to function prevented the POW from talking to the remaining enemy.

In order to relieve the left unit of BLT-3/25 which was particularly depleted and bring BLT-2/25 into one zone, the following was done prior to K?hour; BLT-1/25 relieved Co G of BLT-2/25; BLT-2/25 relieved the left elements of BLT-3/25 with Cos E and G. Co A which had been attached to BLT-3/25 was attached to BLT-2/25 for use as a Res Co, not to be committed without approval from RCT-25. Units in the line from left to right at K-hour were: Co F, Co E, Co G, Co I, Co B, and BLT-2/24. BLT-2/25 was the only unit facing the ocean. BLT-3/25, BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/24 were facing to the east with their front perpendicular to the ocean. BLT-2/25 was ordered to make the main effort and its attack was to be supported by the three remaining BLTs. 

The attack of BLT-2/25 jumped of at K plus 120 (0900) and was met by very heavy MG, sniper and mortar fire. The attack of BLT-2/25 was to be supported by tank fire north into the draws inland from the beach road in an attempt to knock out the mortar positions. To accomplish this BLT-2/24 was ordered to push forward along the beach road and to clear the beach road of mines for passage of tanks. This was accomplished by 1200, but at 1300, BLT-2/24 was ordered to withdraw to its previous positions since its presence along the beach road prevented the use of supporting fires by BLT-2/25. The tanks fired napalm and 75mm fire up some of the draws but were unable to reach all the draws in the area. Gains by BLT-2/25 were very slight and by 1700 an advance of only 100 yards had been made; BLT-2/25 suffered very have casualties in gaining this ground. On the left flank RCT-23 pulled its flank away from BLT-2/25 at 1800, leaving a gap of approximately 150 yards which existed throughout the night. At 1130, Co C was moved to a position behind BLT-2/25. At 1600, one platoon of Co C reinforced with MGs moved to the beach area behind BLT-2/24 and with Co B, 2d Arm Amph Bn provided beach defense.

During the day BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 continuously fired bazookas, AT grenades, 60mm mortars and hand grenades with grenade adapters into the area to their front in attempts to knock out the mortar and rocket positions which were firing on BLT-2/25. However, this fire did not reduce to any great extent the enemy mortar fire. Tanks were used by BLT-2/25 in support of its attack but due to the limitation of the terrain and closeness of own troops, were only able to fire on a few targets. At 1800, units were ordered to consolidate for the night on the ground then held, and contact was made along the whole line except on the left flank where a gap of 150 yards existed between RCT-23 and RCT-25.