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D Plus 10 (D+10), 1 March 1945 - The Assault of Iwo Jima Print E-mail
 

24th Marines - 1 March, 1945

Operation Order 10-45 was received from Division. RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24) was to pass through RCT 23 at King-Hour (0830), and seize O-2 prepared to continue the attack to O-3 on Division Order. BLT 3/23 was attached to RCT 24 until BLT 3/24 was released by RCT 25 at 0730. BLT 2/24 relieved BLT 1/23 and BLT 1/24 relieved 2/23. The reliefs were effected prior to 0630. BLT 2/24 while moving into position received an enemy heavy mortar shell which caused several casualties. Regimental Weapons Company (less 37mm platoons), Co B, 4th Tank Bn and 2d Sec, 1st Prov Rocket Det, operated under RCT control initially 3/14 reinforced by 2/14 was in direct support of RCT 24. Air and naval Gunfire Support were available. The Division artillery fired an intense preparation beginning at 0820 which moved forward in successive concentrations after 0830. The attack jumped off on time with BLT 2/24 on the left and BLT 1/24 on the right. By 0930 BLT 2/24 had advanced approximately 100 yards against heavy enemy resistance. BLT 1/24 was slowly moving forward against very strong enemy opposition. By 0930 BLT 3/24 had returned to RCT 24 and became RCT Reserve. BLT 3.23 was released to RCT 23. At 1030 RCT 24 CP opened at TA 182 S. The attack continued throughout the day against strong enemy opposition and little progress was made. The left flank of BLT 2/24 advanced about 30 yards while the right flank of BLT 1/24 made practically no gain. RCT 21, on the left of RCT 24, was able to move forward at a walk. HILL 382 in the center of the RCT zone was very heavily defended and required extensive demolition work before any advance could be made. RCT 9 passed through RCT 21 at 1600 and continued the attack. Contact between RCT 9 and BLT 2/24 became broken so two companies of BLT 3/24 were moved into line on the left of BLT 2/24 to regain contact. Company K, BLT 3/24 remained in RCT Reserve. The terrain was very poor for tank operations but several were used to support, by fire, the attack of the BLTs. Orders were received to consolidate at 1700. Two air strikes were completed in the RCT zone during the day. Artillery and NGF fired continuously in support of the attack and provided defensive fires and illumination for the night. RCT 24 remained in active contact with the enemy through the remainder of the period. Enemy mortar fire, rifle fire and hand grenades were received by the front lines.

25th Marines - D plus 10, 1 March 1945.

At 2200, 28 February and again at 0230, 1 March, the enemy made large scale attempts to penetrate the lines of BLT-3/25. These attacks were repulsed by the accurate placing of artillery and mortar fire on the enemy group killing an estimated 150 of the enemy. In the zone of BLT-1/25 commencing at 2200, the enemy placed heavy mortar and rocket fire on our front lines and continued to do so throughout the remainder of the night.

The attack was continued at K-hour (0830) in accordance with Div Op Or No. 10-45. BLT-3/24 was relieved by BLT-3/24 which was attached to this RCT at 0930. BLT-1/25 on the left was ordered to make the main effort; BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 in the center and on the right respectively were to hold their positions until the bulge in our lines could be straightened out. BLT-1/25 jumped off at K-hour and was able to push forward approximately 50 yards further than the preceding day and to extend its right flank to within 50 yards of Turkey Knob. The unit on the left did not move from positions held the past two days, and the left flank of BLT-1/25 was again exposed to heavy fire from the commanding ground on the left flank. At 1200, Co B on the low ground gain attempted to make a juncture with the flanking units on the high ground but was again repulsed in its attacks on the strongly fortified cliff line and at 1700 fell back to their original positions. Extremely heavy mortar and rocket fire was again placed on the front lines of the flanking unit of BLT-1/25, which combined with the very heavy MG fire from perfectly camouflaged and strongly emplaced positions on the ridge to the front and on the high ground to the left flank, caused very heavy casualties. At 1700 it was seen that the position of the flanking units was untenable for the night since the high ground to the front could not be seized nor the juncture made with Co B and orders were issued for the withdrawal to a position held on the previous night. As units started to withdraw very heavy mortar and rocket fire was brought to bear on the front lines and it was necessary to lay a smoke screen to cover the withdrawal and evacuate wounded.

BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 made only minor improvements in positions with BLT-2/25 making an advance on its left of 100 yards. The Div. Reconn. Co. was attached to this RCT from 0900 to 1700 for rear area mopping up operations. Positions were consolidated at 1800 and firm contact established between all units.



 
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(c) Copyright 2007 Ray Backstrom