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24th Marines - 28 February, 1945

No enemy activity occurred in the assembly area of RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24 and Company E, BLT 2/24) from 0001 until dawn. RCT 23 with Company E, BLT 2/24 attached and RCT 25 with BLT 3/24 attached continued the attack at King-Hour (0815). RCT 24(less BLT 3/24 and Company E) remained in its assembly area as Division Reserve. BLT 2/24 (less Company E) received enemy mortar fire at 0800 and suffered several casualties. Units spent the day policing the RCT area, salvaging equipment, cleaning weapons and resting. Reconnaissance of the Division zone by staff members and company commanders was continued. A new RCT CP location was reconnoitered in TA 182 S and at 1305 a group went forward to establish the installations. The remainder of the period was quiet.

25th Marines - D plus 9, 28 February 1945.

Activities during the night of 27?28 February consisted of attempted infiltrations and light mortar fire along the whole front. The attack jumped off at K-hour (0815) in accordance with Div Op Or No. 9-45 to seize O-2 with the main effort being made on the left, Co I the remaining Co of BLT-3/24, was attached to BLT-1/25 for use as a reserve Co for the flanking elements. BLT-1/25 on the left attacked in a column of companies through the right flank of RCT-23 in a southeasterly direction to pinch off the strongpoint below Turkey Knob (SW Corner TA 184-F). The leading Co moved across the open ground and into the edge of the wood north of Turkey Knob for an advance of 150 yards. As the troops reached this point the enemy laid down a very heavy mortar and rocket barrage, plus intense MG fire from the high ground 100 yards to the front and from the left flank. The left flank of BLT?1 was exposed since BLT-2/23 on the left had not moved abreast and fire from the commanding ground in the zone of BLT-2/23 decimated the front line of BLT-1/25. At 1030 two more Cos were ordered in the line extending the right flank toward Turkey Knob. At 1215 Co B, which had remained on the low ground to the south of Turkey Knob started an attack toward the high ground east of Turkey Knob. By 1500 this Co had made an advance of 200 yards and had reached the base of the cliff line of which Turkey Knob was a part. After this Co started up the high ground the enemy, well dug in and established on this high ground, began throwing grenades and mines on the advancing troops. MGs emplaced further east on this ground also enfiladed Co B. Co B suffered very heavy casualties and at 1530 was forced to withdraw. When the juncture with Co B could not be made it was seen that the position of the flanking forces was untenable due to the fact that both flanks were exposed, the commanding ground had not been seized, and very heavy casualties had been suffered, therefore orders were issued for BLT-1/25 to withdraw to the closest favorable ground.

In the center, BLT-2/25 attempted to extend its left flank to support the attack of Co B and to push forward and seize the commanding ground to its immediate front. Very little progress was made due to extremely heavy fire and very rugged terrain. Tanks and half?tracks could not be brought into position to support the attack of BLT-2/25 and in order to reduce the pillbox that was holding up the advance a 75mm pack howitzer was requested and sent up to the front lines. The howitzer was assembled and fired about 40 rounds but the direct result of this fire was not apparent. However the front line were able to move forward 75 yards further to a position from which the pillbox was destroyed on the following day. On the right flank BLT-3/25 had by 1000 moved out 100 yards where its advance was halted in order not to break contact with BLT-2/25 on its left. At 1800 units were ordered to consolidate positions for the night.