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Light enemy artillery, mortar and DP AA fire was received from 0001 to dawn. The attack continued at 0810 with BLT 1/24 attached to RCT 25 and BLT 2/24 attached to RCT 23. RCT 24 (less BLT 1/24 and BLT 2/24) remained in Division Reserve in TA 165 O, 166 F,G. The 75mm half-track platoon of Regimental Weapons Company landed during the morning on Beach YELLOW 1. Further reconnaissance was made of routes forward in zones of action of RCT 23 and RCT 25. Co B, 4th Eng Bn (less 1st and 2d plats) continued removing mines from beach areas. Sporadic enemy mortar and artillery fire were received during the daylight hours and a through the remainder of the period.

25th Marines - D plus 2, 21 February, 1945.

Units in line from left to right, BLT-1/25, BLT-2/25, BLT-1/24 were in much better defensive positions during the night of 20-21 February. During the night the enemy attempted to infiltrate through our lines in two and three man groups and continually employed knee mortar fire on the front lines. At 0443, BLT-2/25 repulsed an attack by an estimated 100 Japanese. A large amount of air burst WP, in conjunction with sporadic mortar and artillery fire, was placed on the rear area starting two fires in the beach ammunition dumps on Beach BLUE 1.

Div Op Or No. 2-45 was received during the night for continuation of the attack at K-hour (0810) to seize objective O-2. The plan of attack for RCT-25 with Co A and B, 4th Tank Bn and BLT-1/24 attached was the same as for the preceding day. The attack jumped off at K-hour against heavy small arms fire from numerous pillboxes and under heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. The attack of BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25 was supported by tanks of Co A 4th Tank Bn. Co B, 4th Tank Bn delivered destructive fires on located pillboxes on the cliff line to the front of BLT-1/24. At 1000 the Commanding Officer of BLT-1/25, Lt. Col. H.U. Mustain, was killed in action by enemy mortar or artillery fire in TA 182Y while checking front line positions. Major Fenton J. Mee, the Bn﷓3, performing duty as Bn-X (since D-day) immediately assumed command of BLT-1/25. Slow progress was made in the center by BLT-2/25 and on the left by BLT-1/25 except on its extreme left flank where continued fire from the zone of RCT-23 and the inability of that unit to move to its front prevented the advance of the left elements of BLT-1/25. At 1430 BLT-3/25 was committed between BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25. This was necessary due to a gap being created between 1/25 and 2/25. One Co of BLT-3/25 and one Co of BLT-1/24 were held as RCT Res. At 1700 units were ordered to consolidate positions for the night and contact was established along the front except on the left flank of the RCT where a gap existed which was covered by fire and observation.