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B. 21 Feb. The Regt was boated at 0800 and commenced landing on BEACHES YELLOW 1 and YELLOW 2 at 1345. The Advance CP Landed at 1200 and established at 1225 in vicinity of 148 D. By 1700 all three Bns were ashore and in assembly areas in 148 D, H, I, N. A warning order was received at 1800 releasing the Regt to the 4th Div with expectation of passing it through elements of 23d and 24th Mar the following morning. Necessary liaison was immediately established with the 23rd Mar and supporting units, however, only limited reconnaissance was conducted due to darkness. During the night heavy enemy mortar and Arty fire fell in the vicinity of the assembly area but caused no casualties.

23rd Marines - DOG PLUS TWO, 21 FEBRUARY, 1945

At 2310, BLT 3/23 reported three enemy tanks on the airstrip to its front; an artillery concentration called on this target immediately resulted in the verified destruction of one tank. The remaining two were driven of, and were not again observed. Other enemy activity during the previous night was limited mainly to intense and accurate artillery, mortar, and rocket fire in the RCT zone. No actual physical contact with the enemy was reported. At 0045, the division warning order for the continuation of the attack on the morning of 21 February was received, and a warning order was issued to all major units of the RCT. At about 0445, RCT Operations Order Number 2-45 (dispatch) was issued to all major units of the RCT. King-Hour was set at 0810, with a coordinated artillery and naval gunfire preparation from King minus twenty to King plus twenty. 2/14 remained in direct support of RCT 23. Air was on call at King-Hour with a pre-arranged air strike at selected targets from King plus twenty to King plus forty. the formation of units remained the same with no change in boundaries except for extension to the northward. The LD, the front lines at King-Hour; the objective, O-2. One platoon of tanks from Co C, and one section of 75mm Halftracks from R/W Co were attached to the assault BLTs for the attack. At 0810, the leading units continued the attack, but forward movement was slow.

Increasingly resistance was encountered along the entire RCT front from mortar and artillery concentrations directed at the advancing troops. In addition, the volume and accuracy of fire from concealed machine guns and pillboxes in front of BLT 2/24 at TA 165 B. Engineers were dispatched to the area, but difficulty was experienced in the removal of mines due to the volume of mortar fire concentrated on the approaches to the mine field, and the accurate automatic weapons fire from pillboxes covering the mined area. The total advance for RCT 23 during the day averaged about one hundred yards along the entire front. By 1745, the order from division was received to consolidate for the night on the most favorable ground. Due to the number of casualties in the assault elements during the day, one company from 1/23 was attached to 3/23, and one company from 2/23 was attached to 2/24, to reinforce the lines for night defense. Contact with adjacent units during the day had been lost; however, prior to darkness solid contact was established with RCT 25 on the right and RCT 27 on the left. Except for the detached companies, BLTs 1/23 and 2/23 remained on the Regimental Reserve Line along the seaward edge of the airfield throughout the day, and established a secure secondary defense, with contact with adjacent unit reserves, on this line for the night. During the day some question was expressed over the proper location of the division left boundary, as a result of the troops of RCT 27 being reported within RCT 23 zone. The point of contact with RCT 27 was at 181 O, SW corner, in BLT 1/23's zone, approximately two hundred yards inside the 4th MarDiv left boundary. This adjustment of the boundary between the adjacent RCTs was dictated by the actual location of critical terrain features on the ground.

The operation of tanks in support of the infantry during the day was again limited by the terrain and recurring mine fields in the zone of action. for the most part during the attack, the tanks were maintained at the rear under BLT control and were called forward when they could be employed. The mere appearance of a tank forward with the infantry during the attack resulted in heavy artillery and mortar fire being directed at the vehicles and consequently into the line of the advancing infantry, causing heavy casualties. For this same reason, the further, because of there extreme vulnerability to the heavy fire, the employment of 75mm Halftracks was impracticable, and these vehicles were returned to parent control. During the latter part of the afternoon the RCT 23 CP displaced forward to a more favorable covered position in 164 Y, Northwest corner.