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25th Marines - D plus 1, 20 February, 1945.

The night of D-day was marked by local counter-attacks and enemy infiltration attempts. Accurate enemy mortar and artillery fire fell on the front lines and on the beach areas throughout the night causing many casualties and destroying the beach dumps of BLT-3/25.

Div Op Or No. 1-45 was received during the night and ordered a continuation of the attack at K-hour (0830) to seize O-1. BLT-1/24 and Co B, 4th Tank Bn was attached to RCT-25. The plan of action for RCT-25 was as follows: BLT-1/24 relieved BLT-3/25 prior to K-hour; BLT-3 revert to RCT Res; BLT-1 on the left make the main effort; and BLT-2/25 in the center complete the seizure of the high ground to its immediate front and assist the advance of

Div Op Or No. 1-45 was received during the night and ordered a continuation of the attack at K-hour (0830) to seize O-1. BLT-1/24 and Co B, 4th Tank Bn was attached to RCT-25. The plan of action for RCT-25 was as follows: BLT-1/24 relieved BLT-3/25 prior to K-hour; BLT-3 revert to RCT Res; BLT-1 on the left make the main effort; and BLT-2/25 in the center complete the seizure of the high ground to its immediate front and assist the advance of BLT-1/25 by fire. BLT-1/24 remain in position until such time as BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25 could advance and come abreast.

At 0715, The Commanding Officer, Executive Officer and Operations Officer of BLT-2/25 were wounded by a mortar burst in the BLT CP. Lt. Col. James Taul, Executive Officer of BLT-3/25 was ordered to assume command of BLT-2/25. The attack jumped off at K-hour although considerable difficulty had been encountered in completing proper re-supply and re-organization of front line units on time. Slow advances were made by BLT-1/25 and by BLT-2/25 against very heavy small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, artillery and rocket fire. Tanks of Co "A", 4th Tank Bn supported the attack of BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25 but were of little assistance due to the rough terrain and the fact that every time a tank reached a firing position it was brought under heavy mortar and artillery fire. During the day heavy mortar and artillery barrages were placed along the front lines of BLT-1/25 near AIRFIELD No. 1 and on the beaches. This fire on the beaches made both the supply and evacuation problems extremely difficult and LVT's were used almost exclusively for bringing in supplies.

At 1600, an air strike consisting of 50 cal strafing, rockets and bombs was placed on troops of BLT-1/24 on top of the quarry in TA 193-W. This air strike was delivered without a preliminary run and was placed on the front lines in spite of the fact that yellow front line marking panels were displayed prior to and during the attack, in such positions to be clearly visible. The troops and panels were visible from RCT-25 CP and from positions on the beach. BLT-1/24 suffered 5 killed and 6 wounded from this attack.

By 1800, gains of 200 to 300 yards had been made by BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/15. The left flank of BLT-1/25 was unable to move throughout the day due to the heavy fire received from the left front in the zone of action of RCT-23. At 1800, orders were issued for all units to consolidate, dig in, and establish firm contact between units.