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Page 2 of 9
At 0940, all LSMs hit the beach, and were immediately taken under fire. The 211 had landed in its correct position, but both the 126 and the 216 were from 100 to 150 yards to the north of the points prescribed. Although hit twice almost immediately, the 211 successfully discharged its tanks and withdrew. These tanks (the 4th Platoon, had a detachment of the Co Hq Tank section, attached to BLT 1) started inland from the center of Yellow 1. The tanks of the 126 (the 2d Platoon, attached to BLT 1, and the 3d Platoon, attached to BLT 2) were landed, but within a few minutes, three had either bogged down or had been disabled by mines. The remaining three were reorganized as the 3d Platoon, and this platoon set out for the BLT 1 zone, which it finally reached. The tanks of the 216 (the 1st platoon and a detachment of Co Hq Tank Section, attached to BLT 2) had even greater difficulty. One tank was discharged, but it bogged down at the mouth of the ramp. After a half-hour's effort to recover this tank, the 216 withdrew to the LD. At 1100, another attempt to land was made, this time on Yellow 1, but no tanks succeeded in getting ashore. Repeatedly hit, the 216 again withdrew, and proceeded to the hospital LST (LST 930) behind the LD to discharge its casualties. After repeated orders to attempt to discharge his tanks on the center of Yellow 1, the Commanding Officer of LSM 216 cast away from the Hospital LST and at 1245, proceeded to Yellow 1. By 1300, the remaining vehicles were discharged. These tanks proceeded inland, but were unable to locate a route to the zone of BLT 2. No such route was located that day. Tank operations were therefore limited to the zone of BLT 1, and, because of the hazards indicated, were difficult and relatively ineffective. On request of the RCT Comdr two tank retrievers were landed in an endeavor to assist the assault tanks which were in trouble along the beach. Some progress was made, but the nature of the terrain and the heavy mortar and artillery fire from the flanks constituted a distinct handicap to retrieving operations.
In the meantime, the assault BLTs were meeting increasingly heavy resistance. At 0930 BLT 1 reported its forward elements 250 yards inland, and continuing slowly; ten minutes later BLT 2 reported similar progress, but that its leading elements were pinned down by machine-gun fire from pillboxes to its front and flanks. At 0932, the eight wave of BLT 1 was dispatched to the beach. At the same time, the 37mm platoon of BLT was dispatched, and the shore party elements of BLT 2's eight wave remained afloat. At 1034, BLT 1 confirmed that the entire BLT had landed.
By 1200, BLT 1 was within 200 yards of Airfield No 1. BLT 2, continuing to meet intensive resistance, was about 100 yards less advanced than BLT 1, it having made very little progress since its previous report. Enemy fire continued, with the beach areas receiving frequent and concentrated shellings from heavy mortars and artillery.
At 1300, BLT 3 was ordered to land on Yellow 1, to assemble vicinity Target Areas 148 J 149 A, and to support the attack of BLT 2 with its 81mm mortars. At 1313, its first wave was dispatched from the LD, landing at 1332. The last wave was dispatched at 1338, and had landed by 1358. Shortly after 1400, the shore party elements of BLT 2 were dispatched from the LD, and by 1430, BLT 2 was completely ashore.
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